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7Hume and Spinoza on the Relation
of Cause and Effect
emanuela scribano
In his paper ‘Hume contra Spinoza?’, Wim Klever revived Richard
Popkin’s earlier suggestion that we should mistrust Hume’s con-
demnation of Spinoza’s philosophy. According to Popkin, Hume’s
conventional condemnation of the systematic atheist¹ would seem to
hide the fact that Hume’s own views on the philosophy of religion
derive from Spinoza.² Klever, for his part, broadened Popkin’s per-
spective and proposed to include in Hume’s debt to Spinoza his entire
theory of knowledge. Klever later extended the argument and also
included in Hume’s debt to Spinoza his analysis of the passions and
morals, which, on this reading, are broadly dependent on parts III
and IV of the Ethics.³ In this way, Gilbert Boss’s thesis that Spinoza and
Hume constitute a paradigm case of ‘difference’ between philosophers
was overturned.⁴
¹ See Treatise on Human Nature (THN), (1.4.5) 157 ff. References in parentheses are
to book, part, and section of Hume’s Treatise; page numbers that follow refer to the
Norton and Norton edition speciﬁed in the list of abbreviations at the beginning of this
volume.
² W. Klever, ‘Hume contra Spinoza?’, Hume Studies, 16 (1990), 89–105. R. H. Popkin
introduced the question of Hume’s debt to Spinoza in ‘Hume and Spinoza’, Hume Studies,
5 (1979), 65–93.
³ W. Klever, ‘More About Hume’s Debt to Spinoza’, Hume Studies, 19 (1993), 55–79.
On this see also A. C. Baier, ‘David Hume, Spinozist’, Hume Studies, 19 (1993), 237–51.
Hume’s debt to Spinoza’s philosophy regarding the analysis of the passions constituted,
according to Klever, a further and convincing argument that the young Hume had read
the Ethics. The analysis of the passions was not part of Bayle’s presentation of Spinoza’s
philosophical system and so the similarities with Spinoza’s text cannot be explained in the
light of the reading of the famous article ‘Spinoza’ in Pierre Bayle’s Dictionnaire historique et
critique.
⁴ See G. Boss, La Diffe´rence des philosophies: Hume et Spinoza (Zurich: E´ditions du Grand
Midi, 1982).
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Klever’s ﬁrst article was followed by some perplexed remarks by
Frank J. Leavitt. Against Klever, who, among other things, had poin-
ted out that both Hume and Spinoza held nominalist positions,
Leavitt denied that Hume and Spinoza ever agreed on the doctrine of
universals.⁵ But, most importantly, Leavitt denied any possible agree-
ment between Hume’s and Spinoza’s views on the relation of cause
and effect. According to Leavitt, EIA4—‘The knowledge of an effect
depends on, and involves, the knowledge of the cause’⁶—represents an
‘Aristotelian doctrine of causality the rejection of which was the occa-
sion for one of Hume’s most brilliant contributions to philosophy’.⁷
Because of this it would be impossible to maintain that Hume’s debt
to Spinoza’s philosophy was as extensive as Klever claimed. In his
replies, Klever reconﬁrmed his own thesis on the identity of Hume’s
and Spinoza’s views even with respect to the relation of cause and
effect. In order to establish this, however, Klever did not hesitate to
turn Hume into a rationalist. On Klever’s reading, Hume would have
opposed the idea that experience could ever justify the relation of
cause and effect, as rationalists hold, but this opposition would not
imply denying the necessity of the causal relation, a necessity that
Hume would accept, in full agreement with Spinoza.⁸ In sum, while
Hume’s critique of the relation of cause and effect takes account of
the empiricist claim that it is possible to justify that relation on the
basis of experience, Hume would not hold that all our knowledge is
exhausted by experience. For this reason, as in Spinoza’s case, Hume
would have claimed that there is a necessary connection between the
events that we call ‘cause’ and ‘effect’—that is, a connection that is
not reducible to constant conjunction.⁹
Leavitt’s criticism clearly brought to light the strongest and most
general objection to Klever’s thesis: how can the philosopher who
⁵ F. J. Leavitt, ‘Hume against Spinoza and Aristotle’, Hume Studies, 17 (1991), 203–8, at
204. Cf. Klever, ‘Hume contra Spinoza?’, 94.
⁶ All the translations from Spinoza’s Ethics are taken from C, which will not be cited
independently.
⁷ Leavitt, ‘Hume against Spinoza and Aristotle’, 205.
⁸ W. Klever, ‘A Vindication’, Hume Studies, 17 (1991), 209–13.
⁹ Referring to EIA4, Klever wrote: ‘But I must confess that I ﬁnd nowhere in Hume’s
work a negation of this axiom!’ (‘A Vindication’, 211), and then: ‘That, on the contrary,
Hume was fully convinced of the truth of Spinoza’s axiom, becomes apparent in his
practice . . . Hume never reduces causality to a constant conjunction . . .’.
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has shown that it is impossible to ground the connection between
cause and effect on reason agree in any way with another philosopher
who opened his principal philosophical work with the claim that such
connection is necessary? And, more generally, how can a skeptical
empiricist like Hume be so indebted to a dogmatic rationalist like
Spinoza?¹⁰ This is the question, and Klever’s way of solving it and
replying to Leavitt is, frankly, unacceptable; it consists, essentially, in
denying that Hume was a true empiricist and that on the basis of this
empiricism he undermined the rationalist conception of cause and
effect. Klever’s defense of the agreement between Hume and Spinoza
on the relation of cause and effect was so doubtful that, although
she revived the thesis that Hume’s theory of the passions and morals
was dependent on Spinoza, Annette Baier did not have the courage
to include the analysis of causality among the points of agreement
between the two philosophers.¹¹ Baier justiﬁes this unlikely ﬁliation
with an important remark: ‘That Hume makes his epistemological
home in what Spinoza regarded as the ‘‘mutilated and confused’’
realm of ideas of sense, imagination, and historical narrative is of
course a huge departure from Spinoza, and since Hume’s concept
of cause is one derived from this realm ... his concept of cause is
far from Spinoza’s.’¹² Hume’s theory of the origin of the relation of
cause and effect is to be understood in the light of his analysis of the
ideas of the imagination and their association—that is, in the light of
what, according to Spinoza, is the realm of inadequate knowledge.
The relation of cause and effect, according to Spinoza, is, instead,
one of the ﬁrst axioms that guides the concatenation of adequate
ideas that, in the Ethics, lead to true knowledge of God and the
universe. If this were the whole story, we should conclude with Baier
that, at least when it comes to the relation of cause and effect, there
are no similarities between Hume and Spinoza. But this is not the
whole story.
¹⁰ This is the ultimate reason of V. Maxwell’s rejection of Klever’s thesis. See V. Maxwell,
‘The Dialectic of Enlightment: A Critique of recent Spinoza–Hume Scholarship’, Animus,
7 (2002), 1–23, at http://www.swgc.mun.ca/animus/2002vol7/maxwell7.htm.
¹¹ Baier, ‘David Hume, Spinozist’. Baier warned that ‘of course Spinozism in an empiricist
mode is Spinozism with a considerable difference . . .’ (p. 237). In sum, if the empiricist
Hume inherited some doctrines from the rationalist Spinoza, well then, we should expect
to ﬁnd considerable modiﬁcations in these doctrines.
¹² Baier, ‘David Hume, Spinozist’, 240.
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In order to place the question of the relation of Hume and Spinoza
in the right perspective, we must take into account that, although,
according to Spinoza, it is true that only rational and intellectual
knowledge is adequate, it is also true that a very large part of Spinoza’s
interest in the Ethics is devoted to a reconstruction of the processes
underlying non-rational knowledge—that is, the imagination. The
imagination produces obscure knowledge, but it is not itself obscure;
rather, it is possible to give a philosophical account of it, since it
depends entirely on the necessary mechanisms of human nature. It
is certainly superﬂuous to remind the reader of Spinoza’s polemic
against those who write about the passions as if they were dealing
with ‘not of natural things, which follow the common laws of nature,
but of things which are outside nature’, and ‘who prefer to curse or
laugh at the Affects and actions of men, rather than understand them’
(EIIIPref). Likewise, it is certainly superﬂuous to remind the reader
of Spinoza’s claim that, on the contrary, the affects ‘acknowledge
certain causes, through which they are understood, and have certain
properties, as worthy of our knowledge as the properties of any
other thing’, so that we can discuss the human actions and appetites
‘just as if it were a Question of lines, planes, and bodies’ (EIIIPref).
The faculty—if I may use this notion disliked by Spinoza—that
produces inadequate ideas—that is, the imagination—was subjected
to the same program of scientiﬁc study in part II of the Ethics.
If Hume’s renowned philosophical thesis—that is, the explanation
of the relation of cause and effect—has any source in Spinoza’s
philosophy, this source can be found only in Spinoza’s analysis of
the imagination—that is, in the ‘mutilated and confused realm of
ideas’. So this is the question: besides a relation of cause and effect
grounded in reason, is there also in Spinoza a relation of cause and
effect grounded in the imagination?
Before answering this question we should dwell on two points.
First, we should inquire into the very appropriateness of the question.
Spinoza’s mental universe divides into two spheres: the imaginative
sphere—that is, the world of inadequate ideas—and the rational and
intellectual sphere—that is, the world of adequate ideas.¹³ Both worlds
¹³ On the metaphysical foundation of this theory, see my Angeli e beati: Modelli di
conoscenza da Tommaso a Spinoza (Bari-Roma: Laterza, 1996), 259 ff.
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encompass within themselves coherent systems. Reason and intellect
produce their own metaphysics and theology, which stand in contrast
with the theology and metaphysics produced by the imagination.
Reason and intellect have their own rational and universal morality,
and the imagination has its own morality, variable from individual
to individual, breeding ground par excellence for skepticism.¹⁴ Reason
and intellect have universal knowledge, but the imagination also
produces ‘universals’, those of the schoolmen, that vary depend-
ing on the features that most repeatedly have affected the observer
(EIIP40S). Reason and intellect know the necessary existence of
the ﬁnite modes through their dependence on God,¹⁵ whereas the
imagination—enclosed within the phenomenology of its own percep-
tions—attributes existence to anything that affects the body, including
dreams and ﬁctions,¹⁶ and so on. It would not be surprising, then, if
there were a relation between events that depends on the associations
of the imagination that corresponded to the logical necessity that,
according to reason, relates cause and effect.
Secondly, it is appropriate to clarify that not only does Spinoza
hold a rationalist conception of the relation between cause and effect,
but he is also one of the polemical targets, among others, of Hume’s
brilliant analysis of the fallacies in the rationalist explanation of the
relation between cause and effect.¹⁷ Hume’s critique of the principle
of causality as a principle founded on reason is articulated in two
stages. First, Hume refutes those who believe that the principle of
causality, according to which ‘whatever begins to exist, must have a
cause of existence’ (THN (1.3.3), 56) is intuitively true. Then, Hume
opposes those who believe that the principle is demonstrable. Among
the latter, Hume chooses to refute Hobbes’s, Clarke’s, and Locke’s
¹⁴ The reference is, of course, to the EIApp., which is dedicated to the analysis of the
prejudice that ‘all things in Nature are like themselves in acting with an end in view’ and
to the roots of skepticism, after Spinoza’s explanation of the metaphysics of reason in part I.
The universal morality of reason is announced instead in EIVPref.
¹⁵ EVP30D: ‘Therefore, to conceive things under a form of eternity is to conceive things
in so far as they are conceived through God’s essence as real entities; that is, in so far as they
involve existence through God’s essence.’
¹⁶ See EIIP17C, D, and S.
¹⁷ The only study dedicated to this subject—C. J. Sullivan, Jr., ‘Spinoza and Hume on
Causation’, Atti del XII Congresso Internazionale di Filosoﬁa, xii (Florence: Sansoni, 1961),
431–7—is useless.
232 Emanuela Scribano
arguments. Hume does not provide any example of those authors who
defend the intuitive character of the necessary connection between
cause and effect. But Spinoza certainly belongs to this class of authors,
since he presents the principle of causality as an axiom, the third, to be
exact, of part I of the Ethics: ‘From a given determinate cause the effect
follows necessarily; and conversely, if there is no determinate cause,
it is impossible for an effect to follow’ (EIA3). And certainly Spinoza
would have agreed with those who maintain that it is contradictory,
and not simply false, to say of something that begins to exist that it
does not have a cause. EIA4, in fact, states: ‘The knowledge of an
effect depends on, and involves, the knowledge of its cause.’ Now,
the only argument that Hume provides against those who maintain
that the truth of the principle of causality is intuitive is that the ideas
of cause and effect are separable: ‘as all distinct ideas are separable
from each other, and as the ideas of cause and effect are evidently
distinct, ’twill be easy for us to conceive any object to be non-existent
this moment, and existent the next, without conjoining to it the
distinct idea of a cause or productive principle’ (THN (1.3.3), 56).
Whether or not Hume had in mind EIA4, certainly his argument on
the separability of the ideas of cause and effect would be sufﬁcient
to threaten that axiom. There is a further hint that the generic
reference to those who defend the intuitive character of the principle
of causality hides a reference to Spinoza. Those who defend the
intuitive character of the principle of causality claim it to be ‘one
of those maxims, which tho’ they may be deny’d with the lips, ’tis
impossible for men in their hearts really to doubt of ’ (THN (1.3.3),
56). This characteristic of Hume’s adversaries ﬁts well with Spinoza’s
criticism of Descartes’s theory of judgment. Spinoza accused those
who maintain that the mind is free of assenting to or dissenting from
the contents of the intellect of confusing ‘words with ideas’; because
of this they ‘think that they can will something contrary to what they
are aware of, when they only afﬁrm or deny with words something
contrary to what they are aware of ’ (EIIP49S). In sum, according
to Spinoza, those who deny self-evident truths like the principle of
causality deny them ‘only .. . with words’; and, according to Hume,
those who maintain that principle of causality is intuitive believe
that those who deny it do so only ‘with the lips’ but not ‘in their
hearts’.
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So, Spinoza would seem to be one of Hume’s adversaries in
his analysis of the relation between cause and effect. And there
would be nothing else to add were it not for the fact that there
is a notion of causality in Spinoza that relates to the imagination
rather than to reason. Spinoza not only elaborates a theory of caus-
ality based on adequate ideas—the one expressed in EIA4—but
he also proposed a theory to account for how causal explanation
emerges within the realm of the obscure and confused ideas of exper-
ience and, hence, guides the knowledge and behavior of the people
who are prisoners of the imagination. This theory is presented in
EIIP44, in the ﬁrst corollary, the scholium, and the body of the
demonstration.
EIIP44 states that ‘it is of the nature of Reason to regard things as
necessary, not as contingent’. Since reason ‘regards’ things ‘as neces-
sary’, Spinoza feels obliged to explain the origin of the widespread,
and obviously false, notion of contingency. He provides such explan-
ation in Corollary I: ‘From this it follows that it depends only on the
imagination that we regard things as contingent, both in respect to
the past and in respect to the future.’ Spinoza takes obvious pleasure
in explaining the origin of error; he already gave a celebrated example
of this in EIApp. In this case, however, Spinoza does not limit himself
to what we might call the ‘negative’ explanation to account for why
people believe that they are free that he offered in EIApp.—that is,
the explanation grounded in their ignorance of the causes of their
actions.¹⁸ To this negative reason, Spinoza adds an explanation that
employs the mechanism of association in the imagination, investigated
earlier in EII. The principle of association of the ideas that belong to
the imagination is of basic importance in explaining why the mind
regards things as contingent. As a preliminary, Spinoza recalls the
principle of association described in EIIP18: ‘If the human Body has
once been affected by two or more bodies at the same time, then
when the Mind subsequently imagines one of them, it will immedi-
ately recollect the others also.’ Memory is created this way. In fact,
memory, as Spinoza clariﬁes it in EIIP18S, ‘is nothing other than a
¹⁸ ‘men think themselves free, because they are conscious of their volitions and their
appetite, and do not think, even in their dreams, of the causes by which they are disposed
to wanting and willing, because they are ignorant of [those causes]’.
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certain connection of ideas involving the nature of things which are
outside the human Body—a connection that is in the Mind according
to the order and connection of the affections of the human Body’.
That is, if some past experience has connected two affections of the
body with one another, when one of them presents itself again then
mind will also imagine, that is, remember, the impression that in the
past was connected with that affection. Spinoza is careful to emphasize,
again in EIIP18S, that this ‘connection ... is in the Mind according
to the order and connection of the affections of the human Body’,
and so it is casual and variable from individual to individual, in order
to distinguish it from the connection of ideas in accordance with the
order of the intellect. This connection, or, better, this ‘association’
of ideas that belongs to the imagination, reﬂects the causal order of
experience rather than that of the ideas of reason. The order of the
ideas of the intellect—that is, the rational and scientiﬁc explanation
of things—is that ‘by which the Mind perceives things through their
ﬁrst causes, and which is the same in all men’.
The mechanism of association of the mind in accordance with
the order of experience explains the phenomenon of the union of
ideas that are dissimilar from one another. As in the case of language,
although there is no similarity between the words and the things
they refer to, the mechanism of association connects the former
with the latter due to the frequency with which a certain sound
is uttered in the presence of a thing. By the same mechanism, the
mind of the soldier, seeing the tracks of the horse, will pass on from
thinking of the horse to thinking of the rider and the war, whereas a
peasant will associate the horse with the plough, the ﬁeld, and so on
(see EIIP18S).
In order to explain the origin of the ﬁrm belief that there are
contingent events it is also necessary to keep in mind the principle
presented in EIIP17 (and its corollary and scholium), according to
which the mind imagines the things that affect the body as existing
until some idea excludes the existence of these things. This principle
predicts that the idea of an existing external body does not add
anything to the bare idea of the same body. The idea of an external
body, in the end, is nothing but a modiﬁcation that the affected
body suffers as a result of an encounter with an external body. It
follows that, when the body suffers the same modiﬁcation as the one
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suffered in the past due to the encounter with an external body, the
mind that is nothing but the idea of the affected body, according
to Spinoza, imagines that the external body exists, even if it actually
does not: ‘although the external bodies by which the human Body
has once been affected do not exist, the Mind will still regard them
as present, as often as this action of the body is repeated’ (EII17CD).
Spinoza invokes experience for this principle: ‘all those postulates
which I have assumed contain hardly anything that is not established
by experience ...’ (EII17S).¹⁹
On the basis of the association of ideas that produces what we call
‘memory’, and on the basis of the equivalence between the idea of a
body and the idea of its existence, Spinoza is able to explain the origin
of the notion of contingency:
if the human Body has once been affected by two external bodies at the
same time, then afterwards, when the Mind imagines one of them, it will
immediately recollect the other also, i.e., it will regard both as present to itself
unless causes occur which exclude their present existence. . . . Let us suppose,
then, a child, who saw Peter for the ﬁrst time yesterday, in the morning, but
saw Paul at noon, and Simon in the evening, and today again saw Peter in
the morning. . . . as soon as he sees the morning light . . . he will imagine the
whole day, and Peter together with the morning, Paul with noon, and Simon
with the evening. That is, he will imagine the existence of Paul and of Simon with
a relation to future time. . . .And he will do this more uniformly, the more often he
has seen them in this same order. But if it should happen at some time that on
some other evening he sees James instead of Simon, then on the following
morning he will imagine now Simon, now James, together with the evening
time .. . His imagination, therefore, will vacillate and he will imagine now this
one, now that one, with the future evening time, i.e., he will regard neither
of them as certainly future [certo . . . futurum], but both of them as contingently
future. (EIIP44S; emphasis added)
Let us imagine the young Hume at La Fle`che, bent over the book
by the systematic atheist, and let us try to guess what he would
have made of these propositions of the Ethics. First of all, Hume
would have been struck by the theory of association of ideas by
the imagination and its explanation of how it is possible for stable
¹⁹ On the role of experience in Spinoza, see P. F. Moreau, Spinoza: L’Expe´rience et
l’e´ternite´ (Paris: PUF, 1994).
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aggregates of ideas to form independently of any logical connection
among the ideas. And then Spinoza’s appeal to experience would have
caught his attention. A good suggestion, undoubtedly, to explain the
origin of those truths that Leibniz had called ‘matters of fact’, or, to
use Hume’s terminology, to explain those propositions whose truth
does not depend on the relation of ideas alone. He would then have
read with particular attention the explanation of the origin of the
imaginative notion of contingency. He would have thought that it
contains all the elements needed to provide an excellent explanation
of the origin of the idea of necessary connection—that is, the origin
of that which is opposite to contingency. In fact, claims Spinoza, the
mind of the observer will imagine the existence of Paul and Simon as
soon as Peter appears if it has frequently seen Paul and Simon appear
after Peter. That is, the mind of the observer, by its own laws, cannot
help imagining the existence of Paul and Simon as soon as Peter
appears, even if there is no logical relation among the ideas of Paul,
Peter, and Simon. And the strength of the compulsion to think of
Paul and Simon after seeing Paul will depend on how frequently Paul
and Simon have appeared after Peter. All the elements are present
for the young Hume to write a ﬁrst draft of the sections of book
1 part 3 of the Treatise of Human Nature, the parts devoted to an
analysis of the relation of cause and effect. Following out references
contained in EIIP44S, Hume might go back to read EIIP18—that
is, the proposition devoted to the association of ideas and memory.
There he would notice that Spinoza used that proposition to explain
how it happens that, in the presence of an impression, the mind
brings back to consciousness ideas of events that in the past occurred
together with the event that is presently causing the impression. From
the phenomenon of the association of ideas it follows that the observer
‘will imagine the existence of Paul and of Simon with a relation to
future time. . . . And he will do this more uniformly, the more often
he has seen them in this same order.’ Certainly, Hume would have
thought, the ﬁrst step towards tracking down the link between the
two ideas that we call ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ consists in their past constant
conjunction:
’Tis therefore by experience only, that we can infer the existence of one
object from that of another. The nature of experience is this. We remember
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to have had frequent instances of the existence of one species of objects;
and also remember, that the individuals of another species of objects have
always attended them, and have existed in a regular order of contiguity and
succession with regard to them. (THN (1.3.6), 61)
It would then have been established that the ﬁrst condition for
the formation of the relation of cause and effect is the ‘constant
conjunction’ of two events (THN (1.3.6), 61).
But in order to obtain the relation of cause and effect we need
something more: the idea of a necessary connection between the
cause-event and the effect-event. It is necessary to distinguish between
a simple succession of events, and a connection between two events
such that the second occurs if and only if the ﬁrst occurs. Only the
latter is called a relation of cause and effect. What is the origin of
the idea of a necessary connection? Spinoza claims that the mind will
imagine Paul and Simon as soon as Peter appears ‘the more often he
has seen them in this same order’. The link between the ideas of Paul
and Peter is then a matter of degree. The more often Paul would
have followed Peter, the more inevitable it will be for the mind to
imagine the one when the other appears. Let us imagine what would
happen if Paul had always followed Peter in past experiences. The
mind would then regard Paul as certainly (certo futurum) existing in
the future. Then Hume can write: ‘from the constant conjunction
the objects acquire an union in the imagination. When the impression
of one becomes present to us, we immediately form an idea of its
usual attendant .. .’ (THN (1.3.6), 65). The necessary connection is
nothing but the psychological compulsion to pass from one event to
another, and this psychological compulsion occurs when two events
have always been conjoined in the past.
However, there is still something missing. The mind does not limit
itself to imagining the ﬁre when smoke is present but believes that there
is ﬁre. Spinoza lays the groundwork for explaining this phenomenon.
In Peter’s presence, the mind does not limit itself to imagining Paul,
but it imagines him as existing—that is, it believes that Paul will
appear after Peter: ‘he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simon
with reference to future time’. And this happens because, according
to EIIP17, ‘even though things do not exist, the Mind still imagines
them always as present to itself, unless causes occur which exclude
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their present existence’ (EIIP44S, with reference to EIIP17)—that is,
it is equivalent to think of something and to think of that something
as existing. After having clariﬁed how the mind, in the presence of
smoke, necessarily imagines ﬁre, Hume will devote sections 7 and 8
to trying to explain why, in the presence of smoke, the mind will not
limit itself to imagining ﬁre but will believe that there is ﬁre. Again
Spinoza will be of help here: ‘the idea of existence is nothing different
from the idea of any object, and when after the simple conception
of any thing we wou’d conceive it as existent, we in reality make no
addition to or alteration on our ﬁrst idea’ (THN (1.3.7), 65–6). This
time, however, Hume will feel obliged to add something to Spinoza’s
Ethics in order to explain the belief in the existence of the ﬁre when
smoke is present: the present impression of the smoke transfers part of
its vivacity to the idea of ﬁre that the mind has imagined as existing.²⁰
Hume, in this way, includes the Ethics’ analysis of association of ideas
in his own theory of the origin of belief. However, in this analysis
too Spinoza has precedence over Hume. In the second chapter of
the Tractatus theologico-politicus Spinoza had explained the prophets’
certainty about the existence of non-present events by the vivacity
with which they imagine those very events. Afterwards, Malebranche
had extensively developed this thesis in book two of De la recherche
de la verite´, where the difference between sense and imagination is
related to their different degree of vivacity, a difference that can
be reduced so much as to make indistinguishable imagination and
sensation.
If Paul’s presence has always followed Peter’s presence in the past,
what guarantee do I have that things will be the same in the future?
None, it is evident. Likewise, Hume will say, there is no guarantee
that the sun will rise tomorrow. And, yet, both Spinoza and Hume
claim, it is impossible not to believe that it will rise.
If Spinoza’s analysis of the origin of the belief in contingency
provides the material for explaining the origin of the belief in necessity,
a fortiori Hume will follow Spinoza’s analysis in his explanation of the
origin of the representation of contingency, when the past has not
²⁰ THN (1.3.8), 69: ‘when any impression becomes present to us, it not only transports
the mind to such ideas as are related to it, but likewise communicates to them a share of its
force and vivacity’.
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presented a conjunction of contrary events: ‘ ’Tis evident, that when
an object is attended with contrary effects, we judge of them only
by our past experience, and always consider those as possible, which
we have observ’d to follow from it’ (THN (1.3.12), 91–2). Spinoza,
to repeat, had written: ‘But if it should happen at some time that
on some other evening he sees James instead of Simon, then on the
following morning he will imagine now Simon, now James, together
with the evening time ... His imagination, therefore, will vacillate and
he will imagine now this one, now that one, with the future evening
time, i.e., he will regard neither of them as certainly future, but both of them
as contingently future’ (EIIP44S; emphasis added).
Spinoza also showed that the strength of the link between ideas
depends on the frequency in which they appeared linked in the past:
‘he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simon with reference to
future time ... and this train of events will be more consistent the more
frequently he sees them in that order’. And Hume will explain in this
way the notion of probability, that increases or decreases depending
on the frequency of the constant conjunction: ‘ ’Tis evident, that
when an object is attended with contrary effects, we judge of them
only by our past experience, and always consider those as possible,
which we have observ’d to follow from it. And as past experience
regulates our judgment concerning the possibility of these effects,
so it does that concerning their probability; and that effect, which
has been the most common, we always esteem the most likely’
(THN (1.3.12), 91–2).
Hume does not even stop at the extreme implication of Spinoza’s
reconstruction of the mechanism of association—that is, the identiﬁc-
ation of the process that links unrelated events in the relation of cause
and effect with the process that links words to things. In the relation
of cause and effect, dissimilar ideas are so strongly united that the mind
is compelled to think of the one when it thinks of the other. This
relation cannot be explained in any way through an analysis of the
ideas: they are not correlative ideas and they are logically independent
of one another.²¹ Now, the paradigmatic case of a link between totally
²¹ Hume argues against those who try to argue that any event must have a cause by
naming ‘effect’ the event and then pointing out that the very notion of ‘effect’ implies the
correlative one of ‘cause’ as follows: ‘But this does not prove, that every being must be
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unrelated ideas that is so strong that it is impossible to think of the
one without the other is the link that human institution establishes
between words and things. Spinoza had discussed this particular asso-
ciation of ideas in EIIP18. That proposition plays a crucial role in the
explanation of the imaginative notion of contingency: ‘If the human
Body has once been affected by two or more bodies at the same
time, then when the Mind subsequently imagines one of them, it will
immediately recollect the others also.’ And this is the reason why:
Mind, from the thought of one thing, immediately passes to the thought of
another, which has no likeness to the ﬁrst: as, for example, from the thought
of the word ‘pomum’ a Roman will immediately pass to the thought of the
fruit [namely, an apple], which has no similarity to that articulate sound and
nothing in common with it except that the Body of the same man has often
been affected by these two, i.e., that the man often heard the word ‘pomum’
while he saw the fruit. And in this way each of us will pass from one thought
to another, as each one’s association has ordered the images of things in the
body. (EIIP18S)
As in the case when the ideas of Paul and Simon appear, as soon
as Peter appears, so the link between the sign and the thing signiﬁed
is not justiﬁed by their corresponding ideas but by their constant
conjunction. Hume agrees with Spinoza on this as well. The origin
of the link between sign and thing signiﬁed is the same as that of
the link between cause and effect. There are only three principles of
the association of ideas, according to Hume: ‘I assert that the only
general principles, which associate ideas, are resemblance, contiguity
and causation’ (THN (1.3.6), 65). The relation between the sign and
thing signiﬁed can only belong to the last principle:
There is indeed a principle of union among ideas, which at ﬁrst sight may
be esteem’d different from any of these, but will be found at the bottom
to depend on the same origin. When ev’ry individual of any species of
objects is found by experience to be constantly united with an individual
of another species, the appearance of any new individual of either species
naturally conveys the thought to its usual attendant. Thus because such a
particular idea is commonly annex’d to such a particular word, nothing is
requir’d but the hearing of that word to produce the correspondent idea; and
preceded by a cause; no more than it follows, because every husband must have a wife, that
therefore every man must be marry’d’ (THN (1.3.3), 58).
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’twill scarce be possible for the mind, by its utmost efforts, to prevent that
transition. . . . But tho’ I acknowledge this to be a true principle of association
among ideas, I assert it to be the very same with that betwixt the ideas of cause and
effect, and to be an essential part in all our reasonings from that relation. We
have no other notion of cause and effect, but that of certain objects, which in
all past instances have been found inseparabile. (THN (1.3.6), 65; emphasis
added)
Now, the analogy between the relation of ideas that constitutes
the origin of the imaginative notion of contingency and the relation
between words and things in Spinoza underscores the fact that the
strength of the association of ideas is utterly compatible with its sheer
arbitrary and fortuitous character. At the appearance of a horse, the
soldier and the farmer will inevitably imagine different things:
a soldier, having seen traces of a horse in the sand, will immediately pass from
the thought of a horse to the thought of a horseman, and from that to the
thought of war, etc. But a Farmer will pass from the thought of a horse to the
thought of a plow, and then to that of a ﬁeld. etc. And so each one, according
as he has been accustomed to join and connect the images of things in this or
that way, will pass from one thought to another. (EIIP18S)
It is not surprising that Hume would also want to follow Spinoza on
this point. The analysis of the relation between cause and effect, in
fact, has this provocative result: there is no difference between the
link that unites natural signs (smoke and ﬁre) and the link that unites
conventional signs (words and things). The strength of both links
depends only on a constant conjunction. After all, it is on that very
page of Spinoza’s text that Hume might have come across the concept
that will be a key-concept in his analysis—that is, custom: ‘And so each
one, according as he has been accustomed to join and connect the images
of things in this or that way, will pass from one thought to another.’
Anybody who has studied Hume’s famous critique of the claim
that the relation of cause and effect is grounded on reason knows
that Hume seems to have been inspired by Malebranche, who, in
support of his occasionalism, explained that all causal reasonings are
based on the notorious fallacy according to which what follows is
caused by what precedes it: post hoc propter hoc.²² We do not have to
²² The original suggestion that Malebranche was the philosopher who inspired Hume’s
critique of the relation between cause and effect can be traced back, at least, to C. W. Doxsee,
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give up this belief. On the contrary. Malebranche’s philosophy surely
played a crucial critical role and was essential to Hume’s criticism of
the rational conception of causation, held, among others, by Spinoza
in an extreme form; we should not forget that it was an axiom for
him. But the beneﬁcial awakening Hume’s reading of Malebranche
caused left something unexplained. Why do human minds fall into
the gross error of thinking that what follows has a necessary relation
to what precedes it? Spinoza’s theory of the association of ideas in the
imagination provides the missing explanation. So, Hume completely
reversed Spinoza’s program of replacing the inadequate ideas of the
imagination with the ideas of reason: the Spinoza who theorizes about
the imagination has replaced the Spinoza who theorizes about reason,
having fallen under the attack of Malebranche’s critique.
In conclusion, the weakness of the currently available attempts to
draw a parallel between the philosophies of Spinoza and Hume is
due to the lack of understanding that Spinoza held two theories of
knowledge, that of reason and that of the imagination. After all, as
we have seen, Spinoza explicitly referred to this twofold theory while
introducing the analysis of the association of ideas in the imagination:
‘I say .. . that this connection happens according to the order and
connection of the affections of the human Body in order to distinguish
it from the connection of ideas which happens according to the order
of the intellect, by which the Mind perceives things through their
ﬁrst causes, and which is the same in all men’ (EIIP18S). Once we
clarify that the human mind, according to Spinoza, can be structured
in accordance with either the laws of reason or the associations of the
imagination, we will no longer need to turn Hume into a rationalist in
‘Hume’s Relation to Malebranche’, Philosophical Review, 25 (1916), 692–710. The hypothesis
was inﬂuentially revived by N. Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume (1941; New
York: St Martin’s Press, 1966), 80–90. Hume knows and quotes Malebranche both
in the Treatise (THN (1.3.14), 106) and in the Enquiries (EHU, sect. 7.2, 58 n; EPM,
sect. 3.2, 22 n). Two of these occurrences regard passages where Malebranche discusses
causality (THN 1.3.14; EHU, sect. 7.2). Malebranche had begun to criticize the efﬁcacy of
secondary causes since the ﬁrst edition of the Recherche de la ve´rite´ (iii. 2. iii) OC i. 426: ‘je
ne croi pas qu’on puisse douter, que ceux qui assurent, que l’esprit peut se former les ide´es
des objets, ne se trompent; puisqu’ils attribuent a` l’esprit la puissance de cre´er, et meˆme de
cre´er avec sagesse et avec ordre, quoiqu’il n’ait aucune connoissance de ce qu’il fait: car cela
n’est pas concevable. Mais la cause de leur erreur, est que les hommes ne manquent jamais
de juger qu’une chose est cause de quelque effet, quand l’un et l’autre sont joints ensemble,
suppose´ que la ve´ritable cause de cet effet leur soit inconnue¨.’
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order to acknowledge his debt to Spinoza, nor will Hume’s empiricism
constitute a reason for denying such debt.²³
Universita` degli Studi di Siena
²³ Translation from the Italian by Raffaella De Rosa and Daniel Garber. An earlier
version of this chapter appeared in C. Ginzburg and E. Scribano (eds.), Conversazioni per
Alberto Gajano (Pisa: ETS, 2005), 323–39. I would like to thank Eugenio Lecaldano for his
valuable remarks.
